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Abstract
Masses of experiments have shown individual preference for fairness which seems
irrational. The reason behind it remains a focus for research. The effect of spite
(individuals are only concerned with their own relative standing) on the evolution of
fairness has attracted increasing attention from experiments, but only has been
implicitly studied in one evolutionary model. The model did not involve high-offer
rejections, which have been found in the form of non-monotonic rejections (rejecting
offers that are too high or too low) in experiments. Here, we introduce a high offer and
a non-monotonic rejection in structured populations of finite size, and use strategy
intervention to explicitly study how spite influences the evolution of fairness: five
strategies are in sequence added into the competition of a fair strategy and a selfish
strategy. We find that spite promotes fairness, altruism inhibits fairness, and the
non-monotonic rejection can cause fairness to overcome selfishness, which cannot
happen without high-offer rejections. Particularly for the group-structured population
with seven discrete strategies, we analytically study the effect of population size,
mutation, and migration on fairness, selfishness, altruism, and spite. A larger
population size cannot change the dominance of fairness, but it promotes altruism and
inhibits selfishness and spite. Intermediate mutation maximizes selfishness and fairness,
and minimizes spite; intermediate mutation maximizes altruism for intermediate
migration and minimizes altruism otherwise. The existence of migration inhibits
selfishness and fairness, and promotes altruism; sufficient migration promotes spite. Our
study may provide important insights into the evolutionary origin of fairness.
Author summary
In game theory, the traditional assumption that players are rational (motivated purely
by payoff consideration) predicts that individuals are selfish. In contrast to this
prediction, masses of Ultimatum Game experiments have showed individual preference
for fairness. To expose the mechanisms behind fairness, many evolutionary game models
have been proposed. One of them implicitly studied the effect of spite (only concerns
with one’s own relative standing) on fairness by the competition of four discrete
strategies which represent selfishness, fairness, altruism, and spite, respectively. The
model did not involve high-offer rejections, which have been found in the form of
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non-monotonic rejections (rejecting high and low offers) in experiments. Here, we
introduce a high offer and a non-monotonic rejection to form seven discrete strategies
besides the above four strategies, and three new strategies represent fairness, altruism,
and spite, respectively. Moreover, strategy intervention is used to explicitly study how
spite influences fairness: we add five strategies to the competition between a selfish
strategy and a fair strategy in sequence, and our study goes from the three-strategy
competition to the seven-strategy competition. For group-structured populations with
the seven discrete strategies, we analytically study how population size, mutation, and
migration influence selfishness, fairness, altruism, and spite.
Introduction
For over thirty years, there has been substantial progress in understanding the evolution
of fairness based on the Ultimatum Game (UG). In the UG, a proposer suggests a way
to allocate a fixed sum of money between herself and a responder, and then the
responder decides whether to accept the allocation method or not. If the allocation
method is accepted by the responder, both of them are paid accordingly; if rejected,
neither of them gets paid. If an individual only cares about maximizing his own payoff
(which leads to the subgame perfect equilibrium), the responder should accept any
non-zero offers, and thus the proposer offers the minimum allowable proportion of the
sum to the responder. However, this prediction contradicts with almost all experimental
observations, in which the most common allocation method is the half-half split and the
offers less than 30% of the sum are frequently rejected (see reviews [1, 2]).
In most UG experiments, individuals are observed to only reject low offers (less than
50% of the sum). However, some UG experiments [3–6] have found the rejection of high
offers (greater than 50% of the sum) in nonstudent populations. It has been suggested
that the reason why most previous experiments did not show high offer rejections is
that they are confined to typical student subject pools [7]. The rejection of an offer can
be regarded as the behavior of costly punishment [8–10] because both the responder and
the proposer, who would gain payoffs if the offer were accepted, receive nothing and
suffer the corresponding cost. Some investigations argue that such rejection is
motivated by individual prosocial preference for fairness and indicates the existence of
‘strong reciprocity’ (a behavioral propensity to voluntarily cooperate, if treated fairly,
and punish non-cooperators) [11,12]. However, the preference for fairness is not the only
motivation behind rejecting an offer. By comparing individuals’ propensity to reject
unfair offers in the UG with their tendency to perform various prosocial behaviors in
other games, it has been found that the preference for spite is another potential
motivation [13,14]. This finding suggests that we should pay attention to the evolution
of spite and its role in the evolution of fairness to explain the UG experimental
behaviors.
The evolution of spite and its role in the evolution of fairness have attracted
increasing attention from experiments, but only have been studied by one recent
evolutionary model [15]. This model used a simplified version of the UG with four
discrete strategies (low, accept any), (fair, reject low), (fair, accept any), and
(low, reject low), which represent selfishness, fairness, altruism, and spite, respectively.
It did not involve high-offer rejections, which have been found in the form of
non-monotonic rejections (rejecting offers that are too high and too low) in
experiments [5, 6]. In this paper, we will introduce a high offer and a non-monotonic
rejection to form seven discrete strategies besides the above four strategies, and three
new strategies represent altruism, spite, and fairness, respectively. The previous
model [15] has implicitly given the effect of spite on the evolution of fairness by
analyzing the competition of four discrete strategies. Unlike the previous model,
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strategy intervention will be used here: we will first study the competition between a
selfish strategy and a fair strategy; we will then add five strategies to them in sequence,
and our study will go from the three-strategy competition to the seven-strategy
competition. Accordingly, we can explicitly investigate the effect of spite and altruism
on the evolution of fairness.
In this paper, we will focus on the evolution of fairness in finite populations, and yet
the above-mentioned previous model [15] assumed infinitely large populations. It is
worth mentioning that our study with four strategies recovers to the previous model but
with finite populations. The evolution of fairness has been widely studied by the
evolutionary dynamics of the UG [16–27], in which strategies with higher fitness are
more likely to spread among populations. Evolutionary dynamics [28–34] could
characterize genetic evolution and cultural evolution, both of which have been used to
account for the UG experimental behavior [3, 35]. The classic approach to evolutionary
game dynamics is deterministic, and holds for infinitely large well-mixed populations.
Such deterministic dynamics shows that fairness cannot evolve without additional
mechanisms [16]. To promote the evolution of fairness under the evolutionary
framework, many additional mechanisms have been proposed: reputation (the proposer
knows what offers the responder has accepted in the past) [16], empathy (individuals
make offers which they would be prepared to accept) [17], spatial structures [18–24],
and repeated interactions [25]. Without these additional mechanisms, fairness has also
been found to evolve in finite populations even with the well-mixed structure [26],
suggesting that randomness plays a vital role in the evolution of fairness.
In this paper, we will study structured populations which satisfy the well-known
Tarnita-σ condition [36]. The Tarnita-σ condition is that strategy k ∈ {1, 2, · · · , S} is
favored by natural selection (the average frequency of strategy k over the stationary
distribution is greater than 1/S) under weak selection if and only if
Γ1(akk − a∗∗) + Γ2(ak∗ − a∗k) + Γ3(ak∗ − a) > 0 (1)
where aij is the payoff of an individual using strategy i when interacting with an
individual using strategy j, a∗∗ = 1S
∑S
i=1 aii, ak∗ =
1
S
∑S
i=1 aki, a∗k =
1
S
∑S
i=1 aik, and
a = 1S2
∑S
i=1
∑S
j=1 aij . Two parameters σ1 =
Γ1
Γ2
and σ2 =
Γ3
Γ2
quantify the dependence
of the multi-strategy selection on the pairwise competition and the competition of all
strategies with equal frequency, respectively. The Tarnita-σ condition holds for a large
class of finite populations in which the population structure and the update rule satisfy
some mild assumptions. For example, the population structure could involve
interactions between neighbor nodes on a graph [37] or between individuals of the same
group, phenotype, or set [38–40], and the update rule could be the Moran process, the
Wright-Fisher process, or the pairwise comparison process. For structured populations
satisfying the Tarnita-σ condition, we will first separately investigate the impact of
altruism and spite on the competition of selfishness and fairness, which has not been
explicitly studied so far. The unknown parameters Γ1,Γ2, and Γ3 in equation (1) are
difficult to calculate for general models. However for group-structured populations
together with the Moran process or the Wright-Fisher process, they can be calculated
based on the results in the prior literature [41]. After calculating Γ1,Γ2, and Γ3 in
Table 1, we will use them to quantitatively analyze the effect of population size,
mutation, or migration on selfishness, fairness, altruism, and spite, and compare the
effects from two update rules. A group of group-structured populations can be
understood as an island in population genetics or a particular company in human
society. The group-structured population with one group is the well-mixed population.
The long-term group-structured population without migration evolves just like the
well-mixed population: the absorbing state has all individuals in one group. Accordingly
in the absence of migration, the results are appropriate for the well-mixed population.
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Results
Structured populations satisfying the Tarnita-σ condition
When the selfish strategy S1 and the fair strategy with the low-offer rejection S2 coexist
in the population without other strategies, they compete equally with each other, i.e.,
f1 = f2, because their payoffs are identical for any population states. Fig 1
demonstrates how the competition between selfishness and fairness is influenced by
altruism and spite through adding S3, S4, S5, S6, and S7 in sequence. When the
altruistic strategy with the fair offer S3 is introduced into the population with S1 and
S2, S1 gains an advantage over S2, i.e., f1 > f2. This advantage could be offset, i.e.,
f1 = f2, after the further addition of the spiteful strategy with the low-offer rejection S4.
Similar to S3, the altruistic strategy with the high offer S5 induces S1 to gain an
advantage over S2 again (f1 > f2) in the five-strategy competition. Similar to S4, the
spiteful strategy with the unequal-offer rejection S6 erases this advantage (f1 = f2) in
the six-strategy competition. The advantage of S1 over S2 appears because the
altruistic strategies S3 and S5 are exploited more severely by S1 than S2, and
disappears because the spiteful strategies S4 and S6 punish S1 more severely than S2.
This can be understood intuitively by comparing the row sum of S1 with that of S2 in
Table 2. Similarly, it can be seen when the fair strategy with the unequal-offer rejection
S7 is introduced, the advantage of S2 over S1 is greater than the advantage of S1 over
S7. Therefore, fairness (S2 and S7) first gains an advantage over selfishness (S1), i.e.,
f2 > f1, in the seven-strategy competition. This means that the non-monotonic
rejection can cause fairness to overcome selfishness, which cannot happen without the
high-offer rejection.
Fig 1. Evolutionary dynamics in structured populations satisfying the
Tarnita-σ condition. A: The competition of selfishness (S1) and fairness (S2 and S7)
is influenced by altruism (S3 and S5) and spite (S4 and S6). B: For the seven-strategy
competition, the scores of S1, S2, S3, S4, S5, S6, and S7 are calculated. When a
strategy X offers more to one other strategy Y (Y 6= X), an arrow starts from X and
ends at Y , and then X loses one score and Y obtains one score.
For the seven-strategy competition, f1, f2, and f3 increase with p, and f4 decreases
with p (see Table 3). The conclusion can be intuitively understood from Table 2.
Specifically, we have the following conclusions about S1, S4, S5, and S6 when p
increases: the selfish strategy S1 offers more to S3 and S5, and its offer is rejected by
the remaining other strategies; the spiteful strategies S4 and S6 offer more to S1, S3,
and S5, and their offers are rejected by the remaining other strategies; the altruistic
strategy S5 offers more to S1, S2, S3, and S4, and its offer is rejected by the remaining
other strategies. When a strategy X offers more to one other strategy Y (Y 6= X), we
assume that X loses one score and Y obtains one score. After all possible effects of S1,
S4, S5, and S6 on other strategies are considered, the total score of each strategy
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determines how the corresponding f changes with p: f increases or decreases with p if
the total score is positive or negative, and f does not change with p if the total score is
zero. For the seven-strategy competition (Fig 1), S1 scores 1, the total score of S2 and
S7 is 1, the total score of S3 and S5 is 3, and the total score of S4 and S6 is −5.
Therefore, f1, f2, and f3 increase with p, and f4 decreases with p. Similarly, we can
intuitively understand the change of fi, i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4} with p from the three-strategy
competition to the six-strategy competition. For the rest of the paper, we will only
focus on the case of p = 0.01.
Group-structured populations
Hereafter, the seven-strategy competition will be investigated in group-structured
populations. For the Moran process and the Wright-Fisher process, the average
frequency of strategy k ∈ {1, 2, · · · , S} over the stationary distribution under weak
selection (δ → 0), 〈xk〉δ→0, is given by
〈xk〉δ→0 = 1S + δ 1−uNu (Γ1(akk − a∗∗) + Γ2(ak∗ − a∗k) + Γ3(ak∗ − a)) (2)
in which Γ1, Γ2, and Γ3 are unknown. Here, Γ1, Γ2, and Γ3 can be expressed by
〈xiIjk〉0 which is the probability-weighted average of xiIjk over all possible steady
states under neutral selection (the subscript 0):
Γ1 = S(〈x1I22〉0 − 〈x1I23〉0) Γ2 = S(〈x1I12〉0 − 〈x1I23〉0) Γ3 = S2〈x1I23〉0 (3)
where Iij is the total number of interactions between individuals using strategy i and
individuals using strategy j (each interaction between two individuals using strategy i is
counted twice in computing Iii). The precise value of 〈xiIjk〉0 has been calculated for
the Moran process and the Wright-Fisher process in the prior literature [41]. By using
the known value of 〈xiIjk〉0, we obtain the precise expressions of Γ1, Γ2, and Γ3, which
are shown in Table 1. These expressions hold for any population sizes, non-zero
mutation probabilities, migration probabilities, migration ranges, and group numbers.
Migration of the range r is characterized by f(x), and it is given as
f(x) = 1M−1
∑M−1
j=1 cos
2pijx
M if r =
M
2 for even M
f(x) = 1r
∑r
j=1 cos
2pijx
M else if r = 1, 2, · · · , bM2 c
(4)
where bM2 c is the greatest integer no greater than M2 . Fig 2 shows that the difference of
theoretical results and simulated results is negligible when the selection intensity δ is
sufficiently small and is no longer negligible for other δ. We will study how the
population size N , the mutation probability u, the migration probability v, and the
migration range r influence the evolution of selfishness, fairness, altruism, and spite.
We now focus on the effect of the population size N on the seven-strategy
competition in Fig 3. Irrespective of the population size, fairness (S2 and S7) has a
higher frequency than selfishness (S1), altruism (S3 and S5), and spite (S4 and S6).
Accordingly, a larger population size cannot change the dominance of fairness. In small
populations, selfishness has the second highest frequency. Meanwhile, spite has an
advantage over altruism, i.e., f2 > f1 > f4 > f3, for high mutation probabilities; the
opposite, i.e., f2 > f1 > f3 > f4, holds for the remaining migration probabilities (v) and
mutation probabilities (u). In moderate populations, the former disappears and the
latter holds for the whole area spanned by v and u. In large populations, the (v, u) area
for the latter diminishes and is restricted to low mutation probabilities, and a new
phenomenon appears in which altruism gains an advantage over selfishness, i.e.,
f2 > f3 > f1 > f4, for the remaining values of u and v. In other words, the increase of
the population size can raise the frequency ranking of altruism and reduce the frequency
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Table 1. Γ1, Γ2 and Γ3 for the Moran process (Γ
Mo
1 , Γ
Mo
2 , and Γ
Mo
3 respectively), and Γ1, Γ2 and Γ3 for the
Wright-Fisher process (ΓWF1 , Γ
WF
2 , and Γ
WF
3 respectively), where Φi(f(x)), Ψi(f(x)), Φ
′
i(f(x)), and Ψ
′
i(f(x))
are abbreviated as Φi, Ψi,Φ
′
i, and Ψ
′
i.
ΓMo1 (N − 1)(N − 2)/(3M)
∑M
x=1(−2Φ1Ψ2 − Φ4α1 + 3Ψ2)
ΓMo2 (N − 1)/(3M)
∑M
x=1(3Ψ1 − 3Ψ2 + (N − 2)(−2Φ1Ψ2 − Φ4α1 + Φ2Ψ2 + Φ3Ψ1 + Φ5α1))
ΓMo3 (N − 1)(N − 2)/(3M)
∑M
x=1(3Ψ1 − 3Ψ2 + 2(2Φ1Ψ2 + Φ4α1 − Φ2Ψ2 − Φ3Ψ1 − Φ5α1))
ΓWF1 (N − 1)(N − 2)/(3M)
∑M
x=1(−Φ
′
2(2NΨ
′
2 +Nα
′
1 − 2) + Φ
′
3(2NΨ
′
2 +N − 2))
ΓWF2 (N − 1)/(3M)
∑M
x=1(Φ
′
1(2NΨ
′
1 +N − 2)− (N − 2)Φ
′
2(2NΨ
′
2 +Nα
′
1 − 2)
−Φ′3(2NΨ
′
2 +N − 2) + (N − 2)Φ
′
3(NΨ
′
2 +NΨ
′
1 +Nα
′
1 − 2))
ΓWF3 (N − 1)(N − 2)/(3M)
∑M
x=1(Φ
′
1(2NΨ
′
1 +N − 2) + 2Φ
′
2(2NΨ
′
2 +Nα
′
1 − 2)
−Φ′3(2NΨ
′
2 +N − 2)− 2Φ
′
3(NΨ
′
2 +NΨ
′
1 +Nα
′
1 − 2))
α1 =
1−u
1+(N−1)u Φ1(f) =
(1−u)(2−v(1−f))
2+(N−2)u+2(N−2)(1−u)v
3
(1−f)
Φ2(f) =
2−u−v(1−f)
2+
2(N−2)u
3
+
(N−2)(2−u)v
3
(1−f)
Φ3(f) =
(1−u)(2−v(1−f))
2+
2(N−2)u
3
+
(N−2)(2−u)v
3
(1−f)
Φ4(f) =
(1−u)(1−v(1−f))
1+
(N−2)u
2
+
(N−2)(1−u)v
3
(1−f)
Φ5(f) =
(2−u)(1−v(1−f))
2+
2(N−2)u
3
+
(N−2)(2−u)v
3
(1−f)
Ψ1(f) =
1−v(1−f)
1+(N−1)v(1−f) Ψ2(f) =
(1−u)(1−v(1−f))
1+(N−1)u+(N−1)(1−u)v(1−f)
α
′
1 =
1
N−(N−1)(1−u)2 Φ
′
1(f) =
(1−v(1−f))2
N2−(N−1)(N−2)(1−v(1−f))2 Φ
′
2(f) =
(1−u)3(1−v(1−f))2
N2−(N−1)(N−2)(1−u)3(1−v(1−f))2
Φ
′
3(f) =
(1−u)2(1−v(1−f))2
N2−(N−1)(N−2)(1−u)2(1−v(1−f))2 Ψ
′
1(f) =
1
N−(N−1)(1−v(1−f))2 Ψ
′
2(f) =
1
N−(N−1)(1−u)2(1−v(1−f))2
Fig 2. Comparison of theoretical results and simulated results in the
Moran process (first row) and the Wright-Fisher process (second row). For
the frequencies of selfishness (first column), fairness (second column), altruism (third
column), and spite (fourth column), the difference of the theoretical values and the
simulated values (averaged over 5× 108 − 106 generations) is negligible when the
selection intensity δ is sufficiently small, and is no longer negligible for other δ.
Parameters: N = 50, M = 7, u = 0.1, v = 0.1, r = 1, and p = 0.01.
rankings of selfishness and spite. Accordingly, increasing the population size enhances
the evolution of altruism and weakens the evolution of selfishness and spite. The above
results hold for the Moran process and the Wright-Fisher process. In small populations,
the shape of the boundary of two possible phenomena varies from the Moran process to
the Wright-Fisher process. In large populations, the shape of the boundary of two
possible phenomena remains the same for these two update rules.
It is shown how mutation influences the seven-strategy competition in Fig 4. The
way that mutation changes selfishness, fairness, altruism, and spite is qualitatively
similar for the Moran process and the Wright-Fisher process. In the absence of
migration (the migration probability v = 0), selfishness and fairness exhibit inverted
U-shaped curves with the mutation probability u, but altruism and spite exhibit
U-shaped curves with u. A small increase of the migration probability causes altruism
to change with the mutation probability u from a U-shaped curve to an inverted
U-shaped curve and maintains the change of selfishness, fairness, and spite with u. The
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Fig 3. For different N , comparison of f1, f2, f3, and f4 over the area
spanned by v and u. For the Moran process (first row) and the Wright-Fisher
process (second row), there are two phenomena f2 > f1 > f3 > f4 and
f2 > f1 > f4 > f3 in the small population of N = 20; there only remains one
phenomenon f2 > f1 > f3 > f4 in the moderate population of N = 80;
f2 > f1 > f3 > f4 remains and there appears a new phenomenon f2 > f3 > f1 > f4 in
the large population of N = 660. Parameters: M = 7, r = 1, and p = 0.01.
results for sufficiently high migration probabilities, which are not shown in Fig 4,
qualitatively recover to the result without migration (v = 0). Therefore, intermediate
mutation maximizes selfishness and fairness, and minimizes spite irrespective of
migration; intermediate mutation maximizes altruism for intermediate migration and
minimizes altruism otherwise.
We now investigate the effect of migration (probability and range) on the
seven-strategy competition when the mutation probability u is low (Fig 5) and high
(Fig 6). Migration changes selfishness and fairness qualitatively similarly: they both
have decreasing trends with the migration probability v, and the smallest migration
range r = 1 maximizes both of them. These results hold for all mutation probabilities.
Compared with the case without migration, the existence of migration decreases
selfishness and fairness, and thus inhibits the evolution of selfishness and fairness. The
way that migration changes altruism varies from low to high mutation probabilities:
when the mutation probability u is low, there exists a moderate migration probability v
which maximizes altruism, and the migration range maximizing altruism is from the
largest to the smallest range with the increase of v; when u is high, altruism increases
with v, and the smallest migration range minimizes altruism. Compared with the case
without migration, the existence of migration increases altruism, and thus promotes the
evolution of altruism. The way that migration changes spite also varies from low to high
mutation probabilities: when the mutation probability u is low, the curve of spite with
the migration probability v has an increasing trend and a small perturbation near
v = 0.01, and the smallest migration range maximizes spite for very small migration
probabilities and minimizes spite for the remaining majority of migration probabilities;
when u is high, spite increases with v, and the smallest migration range minimizes spite.
Compared with the case without migration, sufficient migration (v is not too low when
u is low) increases spite, and thus promotes the evolution of spite. The above results are
appropriate for the Wright-Fisher process and the Moran process. These two update
rules have a qualitative difference for the smallest migration range and small mutation
probabilities: the curves of selfishness, fairness, altruism, and spite with the migration
PLOS 7/15
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Fig 4. The changing trends of fi, i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4} with u. A, C: For the Moran
process with v = 0 and the Wright-Fisher process with v = 0, f1 and f2 exhibit inverted
U-shaped curves with u, but f3 and f4 exhibit U-shaped curves with u. B, D: For the
Moran process with v = 0.05 and the Wright-Fisher process with v = 0.05, f1, f2, and
f3 exhibit inverted U-shaped curves with u, but f4 exhibits a U-shaped curve with u.
Parameters: N = 80, M = 7, r = 1, and p = 0.01.
probability v have small perturbations at v = 1 for the latter but not for the former.
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Fig 5. The changing trends of fi, i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4} with v for the Moran
process (first row) and the Wright-Fisher process (second row) when u is
low. f1 (first column) and f2 (second column) have decreasing trends with v, and r = 1
maximizes f1 and f2 for all values of v. The curve of f3 (third column) with v is
inverted U-shaped, and the migration range maximizing f3 goes from r = 3 to r = 1
with the increase of v. The curve of f4 with v (fourth column) has an increasing trend
and a small perturbation near v = 0.01, and r = 1 maximizes f4 for very small v and
minimizes f4 for the remaining large v. When r = 1, the curve of fi, i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4} with
v has a small perturbation near v = 1 for the Wright-Fisher process, but not for the
Moran process. Parameters: N = 80, M = 7, u = 0.01, and p = 0.01.
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Fig 6. The changing trends of fi, i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4} with v for the Moran
process (first row) and the Wright-Fisher process (second row) when u is
high. f1 (first column) and f2 (second column) decrease with v, and r = 1 maximizes
f1 and f2 for all values of v. f3 (third column) and f4 (fourth column) increases with v,
and r = 1 minimizes f3 and f4 for all values of v. Parameters: N = 80, M = 7, u = 1,
and p = 0.01.
Conclusion
We have studied the effect of spite and altruism on the evolution of fairness in an
evolutionary model using the simplified version of the UG with seven representative
discrete strategies. A simplified version of the UG with four discrete strategies has been
used to investigate the effect of spite on the evolution of fairness in a previous
evolutionary model [15]. The previous model assumed two kinds of offers (low and fair)
and two kinds of veto power (accept any and reject low), and did not consider high-offer
rejections which have been found in the form of non-monotonic rejections (rejecting
offers that are too high and too low) in experiments [5, 6]. Based on the previous
model [15], we have added a high offer and a non-monotonic rejection. Our model
includes the four strategies in the previous model (separately represent selfishness,
fairness, altruism, and spite) and has three new strategies (separately represent
altruism, spite, and fairness). Moreover, the analysis method in our study is different
from that in the pervious study [15]. The previous study has only investigated the
four-strategy competition in infinite populations, and has implicitly demonstrated that
spite promotes the evolution of fairness under certain conditions. Our study has used
strategy intervention in finite populations to explicitly study how spite influences the
evolution of fairness: we start with the competition between a selfish strategy and a fair
strategy; we then add five strategies to the competition in sequence, and our study goes
from the three-strategy competition to the seven-strategy competition. In the
two-strategy competition, selfishness competes equally with fairness. The addition of
altruism leads to the advantage of selfishness over fairness, and this advantage can be
offset by the further addition of spite. Accordingly, we have explicitly shown that
altruism inhibits the evolution of fairness, whereas spite promotes the evolution of
fairness. Fairness first gains an advantage over selfishness when the fair strategy with
the non-monotonic rejection is added, and thus we have found that the non-monotonic
rejection can cause fairness to overcome selfishness, which cannot happen without the
high-offer rejection. It is worth mentioning that the four-strategy competition of our
model corresponds to the finite-population version of the previous model [15].
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Most previous studies about the UG, including the above-mentioned literature [15],
have neglected the role of population finiteness in the evolution of fairness. Traditional
deterministic evolutionary dynamics [16] has shown that fairness cannot evolve in
infinite populations without other mechanisms. Until recently, a stochastic evolutionary
model [26] has demonstrated that fairness can evolve in finite populations without any
other mechanisms, meaning that the finiteness of the population matters in the
evolution of fairness. In this paper, structured populations of finite size satisfying the
Tarnita-σ condition [36] have been used to study the simplified version of the UG.
Particularly for the group-structured population together with the Moran process or the
Wright-Fisher process, we have obtained the concrete Tarnita-σ condition (without
unknown parameters), based on the previous calculation [41], which has only been used
to analyze the multiple-strategy competition in general models. By using the concrete
Tarnita-σ condition, we have studied the effect of the population size on the
seven-strategy competition. For the Moran process and the Wright-Fisher process, a
larger population size cannot change the dominance of fairness, but it enhances the
evolution of altruism and weakens the evolution of selfishness and spite.
The effect of migration on the evolution of fairness has been previously studied by
agent-based simulations [24]. Here, we have given the analytic results about how
migration and mutation influence the seven-strategy competition. The Moran process
and the Wright-Fisher process have the following qualitatively similar results.
Intermediate mutation maximizes selfishness and fairness, and minimizes spite
irrespective of migration; intermediate mutation maximizes altruism for intermediate
migration and minimizes altruism otherwise. The existence of migration inhibits the
evolution of selfishness and fairness, and promotes the evolution of altruism; sufficient
migration promotes the evolution of spite. The single qualitatively different result
between the Moran process and the Wright-Fisher process lies at the smallest migration
range and small mutation probabilities: the curves of selfishness, fairness, altruism, and
spite with the migration probability v have small perturbations at v = 1 for the latter
but not for the former.
Model and methods
Model
In the UG, the proposer has to divide a certain amount of money, say 1, with the
responder who can accept or reject the split. If the responder accepts the split, the
money is shared accordingly; if not, both individuals remain empty handed. We focus
on a simplified version of the UG in Fig 7. Proposers have three kinds of offers: fair
(0.5), low (p > 0, p→ 0), and high (0.5 + p), in which the first one is an equal offer for
the proposer and the responder and the latter two are unequal offers. Experiments
which investigated the responder behavior [5, 6] have displayed that many responders
use non-monotonic rejections (rejecting offers that are too high and too low).
Accordingly, we here assume that responders have three kinds of veto power: accept any,
reject low, and reject unequal (reject low and high). Seven representative discrete
strategies, each of which denotes what choice to make as a proposer and what choice to
make as a responder, will be used: S1 = (p, accept any), S2 = (0.5, reject low),
S3 = (0.5, accept any), S4 = (p, reject low), S5 = (0.5 + p, accept any),
S6 = (p, reject unequal), and S7 = (0.5, reject unequal).
The individual using S1 only cares about maximizing his own payoff, and thus S1
represents selfishness. The individual using S2 or S7 is willing to sacrifice his own payoff
to pursue fairness (the proposer gives up his priority and plays fair to the opponent, and
the responder punishes the low offer or the unequal offers), and thus S2 and S7 represent
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Fig 7. Model schematic. (A) The simplified version of the UG with seven
representative discrete strategies. (B) Migration of the range r when seven groups are
located in a circle.
fairness. The individual using S3 or S5 is kind to his opponent using any strategies (the
proposer volunteers to give the opponent a non-low offer, and the responder allows the
opponent to obtain a higher payoff than himself), and thus S3 and S5 represent
altruism. The individual using S4 or S6 is concerned with his own relative standing (the
proposer is always trying to get a higher payoff than the opponent, and the responder
will not leave his own payoff below his opponent’s), and thus S4 and S6 represent spite.
We will first consider the population structure (determines whom an individual
interacts with) and the update rule (determines how individuals compete for
reproduction) satisfying the Tarnita-σ condition. Any one given interaction is comprised
of two games, in which two individuals play the roles of proposer and responder
alternately. The payoff matrix for the simplified version of the UG is shown in Table 2.
All interactions accumulate the payoff of individual i, pi, and further his fitness,
fi = 1 + δpi. There may occur mutation during reproduction: mutation happens to an
offspring with probability u, and then he equi-probably chooses one of all possible
strategies; otherwise (with probability 1− u), the offspring inherits the strategy of his
parent.
Table 2. The payoff matrix for the simplified version of the UG.
S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 S6 S7
S1(p, accept any) 1 1/2 3/2-p p 3/2 p 1/2
S2(0.5, reject low) 1/2 1 1 1/2 1+p 1/2 1
S3(0.5, accept any) 1/2+p 1 1 1/2+p 1+p 1/2+p 1
S4(p, reject low) 1-p 1/2 3/2-p 0 3/2 0 1/2
S5(0.5 + p, accept any) 1/2 1-p 1-p 1/2 1 p 1/2
S6(p, reject unequal) 1-p 1/2 3/2-p 0 1-p 0 1/2
S7(0.5, reject unequal) 1/2 1 1 1/2 1/2 1/2 1
We will then consider two particular models, the Moran process and the
Wright-Fisher process in the group-structured population. The whole population of size
N is distributed over M groups which are located in a circle, and an individual only
interacts with all others of the same group. In the Moran process, all individuals of the
population compete to reproduce one offspring proportional to their fitness, and then
one individual is equi-probably chosen from the whole population to die. In the
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Wright-Fisher process, all individuals of the population compete to reproduce N
(population size) offspring proportional to their fitness, and the whole population is
replaced by all the newborn offspring. Besides mutation, migration is also introduced
into our model: with probability 1− v, the offspring remains in his parent’s group; with
probability v, he moves to a new group according to the migration pattern of the range
r in Fig 7. The migration range r means that all possible displacements generated by a
single-step migration form the set Ω(r) = {1, 2, · · · , r} and all elements of Ω(r) are
performed equi-probably.
Methods
Let Fk = Γ1(akk − a∗∗) + Γ2(ak∗ − a∗k) + Γ3(ak∗ − a). Under weak selection, the
stationary frequency of Si is greater than that of Sj if and only if Fi is greater than Fj .
When selfishness, fairness, altruism, or spite is exhibited by a single strategy, we assume
fi = Fi with i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}. When fairness, altruism, or spite is exhibited by two
strategies, we assume f2 = (F2 + F7)/2, f3 = (F3 + F5)/2, or f4 = (F4 + F6)/2. This is
because all possible strategies have similar frequencies under weak selection and our
assumption can guarantee that the comparison among selfishness, fairness, altruism,
and spite proceeds on the same scale. The comparison is based on f1, f2, f3, and f4 in
Table 3. For example, selfishness has an advantage over fairness if and only if f1 > f2,
the reverse holds if and only if f1 < f2, and they compete equally if and only if f1 = f2.
Table 3. f1, f2, f3, and f4.
f2 = F2 or f3 = F3 or f4 = F4 orf1 = F1 f2 = (F2 + F7)/2 f3 = (F3 + F5)/2 f4 = (F4 + F6)/2
three-strategy
competition
3(1−2p)Γ2+(1−3p)Γ3
9
−Γ318 − 6(1−2p)Γ2+(1−6p)Γ318
four-strategy
competition
Γ1
4
Γ1
4
Γ1−2(1−2p)Γ2+2pΓ3
4
−3Γ1+2(1−2p)Γ2−2pΓ3
4
five-strategy
competition
10Γ1+10Γ2+3Γ3
50
5Γ1+10pΓ2−(1−5p)Γ3
25
10Γ1−10(2−p)Γ2−(2−50p)Γ3
50
−40Γ1+10(3−4p)Γ2+(3−20p)Γ3
50
six-strategy
competition
12Γ1+12pΓ2+(1+6p)Γ3
36
12Γ1+12pΓ2+(1+6p)Γ3
36
24Γ1−36(1−p)Γ2−(1−18p)Γ3
72
−48Γ1+(36−60p)Γ2−(1+30p)Γ3
72
seven-strategy
competition
2Γ1+2pΓ2+pΓ3
7
8Γ1+4pΓ2+(1+2p)Γ3
28
4Γ1−6(1−p)Γ2+3pΓ3
14
−20Γ1+4(3−5p)Γ2−(1+10p)Γ3
28
Three-strategy competition is the competition of s1, s2, s3, four-strategy competition is the competition of s1, s2, s3, s4,
five-strategy competition is the competition of s1, s2, s3, s4, s5, six-strategy competition is the competition of
s1, s2, s3, s4, s5, s6, and seven-strategy competition is the competition of s1, s2, s3, s4, s5, s6, s7.
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